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Category Archives: Historical Philosophers

Carl von Clausewitz Applied: Tarawa & Normandy

Introduction

Carl von Clausewitz, Prussian General, military strategist, and noted author of On War, led men into battle for both the Prussian and Russian Armies in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries. His book On War is military philosophy and war as Clausewitz saw it; that is, his thoughts and principles are based upon his years of fighting in battles and leading armies which provided the experience and ultimately the impetus for his classic contribution to the volumes of thought on strategy and war. Critics have contended that his principles and theories are narrow in scope; that is, that they are seemingly “locked in time”, applicable only to the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Historians and military leaders cite the writings of SunTzu in The Art of War as a having “clearer vision, more profound insight, and eternal freshness.” [1] It is important to note here that Clausewitz, unlike the mythical Sun Tzu, was drawing upon his experiences in On War, which gives it more credibility and credence: “… Clausewitz’s work is a highly personal, in some respects almost autobiographical document that removes it even further from modern varieties of theory.” [2] On War is autobiographical in a sense – the author writing of that which he saw of war for what it was; war at its most basic and tactical level as well as the political and moral components. In that process, Clausewitz’s On War evolved into the enduring writing that we have now. Peter Paret, in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age compares the work of Clausewitz to that of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws; their parallel lives and work: “Both men develop the generalizations, the high levels of abstraction that gives their works lasting value, by pondering and reacting to the specifics of their condition and experience, specifics that are clearly apparent in their work.” [3]

That Clausewitz lived and fought his wars ‘land-locked’ on the mainland of Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Europe, his principles and theories written in On War lack any mention or treatment of naval warfare and its component amphibious warfare: “Clausewitz has been criticized for his inability to transcend his experiences as a soldier of a land-locked monarchy, and to recognize the other half of war at this time.” [4] My thesis contends that On War is relevant in the modern era, that era defined as the Twentieth Century onward, and synthesizes select principles of Clausewitz through two historic amphibious landings: 1943’s battle for Tarawa in the Pacific, and 1944’s invasion of Normandy, France (also referred to as “D-Day” or ‘Operation Overlord’). The aforementioned events were determinant; each seminal turning points in their respective theaters and as such provide fertile ground for Clausewitz’s principles. The Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944 helped to turn the tide of war in Europe by redirecting Hitler’s focus away from the Eastern Front, while the US Marines’ landing on Tarawa in 1943 was the first contested amphibious assault on a fortified position of the War in the Pacific and would provide critical experience and lessons for the remainder of their war. Clausewitz’s principles, while written of land-based warfare only, are more than sufficient to support this overarching thesis.

To begin qualifying a thesis such as this with such a broad tool as On War, it is essential to implement parameters around this paper. Rather than citing just historical thought and passages known about On War to support my thesis, thus imparting bias, I shall include where possible, those critics of Clausewitz and their dissenting theories.

Clausewitz on Tarawa; 1943

If the War in Europe was fought on the football field of battle, then the War in the Pacific was a fought as a steel-cage death match. This analogy on the myriad dissimilarities between the two theaters, while oversimplified, beckons a reminder to the harshness of the island fighting endured by the US Marines. The three-day battle was fought on the tiny island Betio (rhymes with ratio), part of the Tarawa Atoll, which was a mere three hundred acres – the same size as Washington D.C.’s Pentagon building and its parking lots today.[5] There was no option of retreat for either adversary; certainly not for the defender or the US Marines, the latter having a rendezvous with historic destiny. It was ‘absolute war’ as Clausewitz called it.

Attack on Defensive Positions

For the US Marines during the Second World War, their ‘island hopping’ campaign throughout the Pacific by definition was a series of amphibious assaults on strongly defended positions. This island hopping campaign as strategy proved successful for the US Navy, Marine Corps, and Army throughout the Pacific. Their initial successful landing depended largely upon a long and intense naval bombardment campaign as part of the overall US Navy’s strategy in defeating the Japanese. Clausewitz recognized the necessity of “wearing the enemy forces down” or “neutralizing them.”[6]  It was planned that the pre-invasion bombardment of Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll would neutralize the Japanese defense forces. Failing that, Clausewitz favored attacking a defender’s flanks as opposed to a straight-on assault. On Betio Island, the Marines did not have the luxury of a typical flank to attack; thus, faced incredible odds in their attack of the well-built defensive positions.  US Navy Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, who led the invasion force into Tarawa stated after the three days of Tarawa: “I have always had the feeling that the margins between success and failure in an amphibious operation conducted against strongly defended positions was a narrow one.”[7] These ‘narrow margins for such success’ on Tarawa would fall on the shoulders of a very few US Marines. Clausewitz noted in On War’s Book Seven; Chapter Nine ‘Attack on Defensive Positions’: “One thing, however, is sure, and fundamental to the issue: it is risky business to attack an able opponent in a good position.”[8] It was risky for the Marines on Tarawa – worsened by the unknown elements or friction in war.

The Relationship between Attack and Defense in Strategy

For the Japanese in their conquest of the Western Pacific during the Second World War, impressive and unyielding defensive fortifications were built on many of the islands. On Betio, the main island on the Tarawa Atoll, this was no exception. The Japanese aggressors, as defenders, enjoyed what Clausewitz termed “The advantage of terrain”, from Chapter Three of his Sixth Book in On War.[9] Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC Retired, in Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa adds:

The Japanese thus recognized Tarawa’s strategic importance as a perimeter outpost as early as thirteen months before the American invasion. To the extent possible, IGHQ accorded Tarawa top priority and supplied the forces on Betio with generous amounts of troops, weapons, fortification materials, engineering expertise, and labor. American expeditionary forces would not encounter a more sophisticated series of defensive positions on any subsequent island until they reached Iwo Jima in 1945. Yardfor yard, Betio was the toughest fortified position the Marines would ever face.[10]

For Clausewitz, these defensive tactics are part of an overall strategy for success. In addition to ‘the advantage of terrain’, Clausewitz’s first element, his fourth element is most pertinent to the Japanese fortifications on Betio: “Strengthening the theater of operations, by fortresses, with all they involve.”[11] For as seemingly impregnable as the Japanese defensive fortifications were on Betio, the three-day battle was ultimately won by the Marines. The Marines’ victory as seen through Clausewitz’s On War is attributed to what he termed “military genius.” Clausewitz, in his discussion on the strength of defense, speaks to the offensive factor of courage and talent by a commander in overtaking a defense. At the close of Book Sixes’ Chapter three he offers:

[Defense] is a stronger form of war than attack. But we still have to mention a minor factor that so far has been left out of account. It is courage: the army’s sense of superiority that springs from the awareness that one is taking the initiative. This affinity is a real one, but it is soon overlaid by the stronger and more general spirit that an army derives its victories or defeats, and by the talent or incompetence of its commander.[12]

The Marines’ victory was due greatly in-part to what Clausewitz called the “talent of its commander.” [13] As US Navy Admiral Raymond Spruance would have called it, the US Marines’ victory was a victory by the narrowest of margins.[14] Colonel David M. Shoup was the only living Marine to win the Medal of Honor on Tarawa, for what Clausewitz called “talent and competence.”[15] It was through his determination that helped get the Marines ashore through the relentless enemy fire at Betio Island. His CMOH citation reads:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as commanding officer of all Marine Corps troops in action against enemy Japanese forces on Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert Islands, from 20 to 22 November 1943. Although severely shocked by an exploding enemy shell soon after landing at the pier and suffering from a serious, painful leg wound which had become infected, Col. Shoup fearlessly exposed himself to the terrific and relentless artillery, machinegun, and rifle fire from hostile shore emplacements. Rallying his hesitant troops by his own inspiring heroism, he gallantly led them across the fringing reefs to charge the heavily fortified island and reinforce our hard-pressed, thinly held lines. Upon arrival on shore, he assumed command of all landed troops and, working without rest under constant, withering enemy fire during the next 2 days, conducted smashing attacks against unbelievably strong and fanatically defended Japanese positions despite innumerable obstacles and heavy casualties. By his brilliant leadership daring tactics, and selfless devotion to duty, Col. Shoup was largely responsible for the final decisive defeat of the enemy, and his indomitable fighting spirit reflects great credit upon the U.S. Naval Service. [16]

The incredible resolve exhibited by Colonel Shoup at Tarawa exemplifies many of Clausewitz’s principles debated within the paper. Were he, Clausewitz, a modern warrior and writing his magnum opus in 2011 he could have cited the leadership and “talent” of Shoup before Napoleon.

Detractors of Clausewitz are quick to point out that his ‘defense as a stronger form of war’ has had problems of acceptance and adaptation over the decades.  Paret in Makers of Modern Strategy notes that “For instance, his statement that defense was the stronger form of fighting was misunderstood and rejected by several generations of German soldiers, whose analytical capacities were dimmed by their country’s geopolitical situation.”[17]

Friction in War

Book One, Chapter Seven titled “Friction in War” is one of Clausewitz’s better known principles and as such none represents a more salient statement for the battle for Tarawa. Clausewitz offers: “Friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.” [18] An opposed amphibious landing is difficult at best; moreover, the assault and beach landings on Tarawa proved to be one of the costliest for the US Marine Corps in terms of lives lost; “The ‘Friction of War’ applied: nothing was easy on Betio” as Alexander reminds in Utmost Savagery. [19] Somewhat prophetically, Clausewitz in Chapter Seven’s ‘Friction of War’ adds: “Moreover, every war is rich in unique episodes. Each is an uncharted sea, full of reefs. The commander may suspect the reefs’ existence without ever having seen them; now he has to steer past them in the dark.” [20] The Marines’ first encounters with Clausewitz’s “friction of war” were the reefs surrounding the Tarawa Atoll.

Clausewitz at ‘D-Day’; 1944

“War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.” [21] This one of Clausewitz’s more popular concepts on the political component of war, an element of his “dual nature of war”, has a deeper context for the Second World War. For Hitler the “Atlantic Wall” was a continuation of his policy for the domination of Europe which in turn was a continuation of his life-long retaliation against the Versailles Treaty with the Third Reich and Wehrmacht as the delivery mechanism. D-Day, or the Allied invasion of Normandy France, was the continuation of the Allied war policy by FDR, Churchill, and Stalin.

Surprise, deception, diversion, and intelligence

D-Day brings about an important conundrum for the application of Clausewitz. The well-planned and intricate Allied deception campaign that was developed and implemented prior to the landings resulted in the element of surprise for the defending Wehrmacht forces. Clausewitz offered little on the elements of intelligence or deception and considered them “unreliable and impracticable.” [22] He did offer in Book One, Chapter Two’s ‘Purpose and Means in War’ that “Destruction of the enemy’s force is only a means to an end, a secondary matter. If a mere demonstration is enough to cause the enemy to abandon his position, the objective has been achieved…”[23] This statement, while hardly meeting the elements needed to qualify as deception, is not problematic as there was little in Clausewitz’s era which could enable deception, i.e., radio technology, etc. except for the feint of troop movements.  However, his awareness of “mere demonstration” does offer that he saw that as a tactical element in warfare.

On War’s Book Three; Chapter Nine titled ‘Surprise’ proves an intriguing if not obvious chapter in addressing ‘D-Day.’ In ‘Surprise’, Clausewitz dances all around the topic of deception and intelligence but just can’t bring himself to a steady courtship with these strategic elements: “We are not speaking here of a surprise assault, which falls under the general category of ‘attack,’ but of the desire to surprise the enemy by our plans and dispositions, especially those concerning the distribution of forces.”[24] This chapter is an example of the many instances of contradiction found in On War. Clausewitz believed in the element of surprise but negated its overall effectiveness: “But the wish to achieve surprise is common and, indeed, indispensable, and while it is true that it will never be completely ineffective, it is equally true that by its very nature surprise can rarely be outstandingly successful. It would be a mistake, therefore, to regard surprise as a key element of success in war.”[25] Interestingly, Clausewitz saw the element of surprise as a “tactical device” with more potential in that realm than as a strategy. For the architects of ‘Operation Overlord’, surprise was an overarching strategy and the end-game for the D-Day invasion: “Along with the surprise they achieved, the sheer size of the Normandy landings was key to their success.” [26] Clausewitz in absorbing the American, British, and Canadian successes on Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword Beaches would have marveled at his countrymen’s gullibility of 1944’s Allied feint. Undoubtedly however, he would have substantiated the Allied successes to the overwhelming numbers of troops coming ashore.

Certainly Churchill and the other Allied leaders read On War and the following passage from Clausewitz when ‘Operation Fortitude’ was in its formative stages: “Preparations for war usually take months. Concentrating troops at their main assembly points generally requires the installation of supply dumps and depots, as well as considerable troop movements, whose purpose can be guessed soon enough.” [27] ‘Operation Fortitude’ was the D-Day deception plan crafted by British mastermind Roger Hesketh which made the Normandy landings so successful; furthermore, its components included concentrating troops, real or otherwise, at various assembly points, their movements, and the placement of phony tanks and landing ships.[28] Based on Clausewitz’s statement that “a mere demonstration is enough to cause the enemy to abandon his position”,[29] the elaborate ‘Fortitude’ plan worked magnificently. As Antony Beevor states in D-Day: The Battle for Normandy, “Fortitude was the most ambitious deception in the history of warfare…”[30] For Hitler’s Wehrmacht, it was certainly a surprise.

That Clausewitz’s On War was a legacy of its era, so were the author’s thoughts on diversion and deception: “Plans and orders issued for appearances only, fake reports designed to confuse the enemy, etc. – have as a rule so little strategic value that they are used only if a ready-made opportunity presents itself. They should not be considered as a significant independent field of action at the disposal of the commander.”[31] I am certain that were Clausewitz fighting and writing in the modern era he would have felt differently about this statement. While he uses the term ‘strategic value’ what he really means is tactical value; that is, typically commanders in the field would be employing tactical methodologies. Clausewitz, in his statement on diversion and deception, taken at face value, does not see any worth “as a rule.” Clausewitz does however offer “that they are used only if a ready-made opportunity presents itself.”[32] There can be no arguing that the necessity for the planning and implementation of ‘Operation Overlord’ and subsequent Allied Invasion as a strategy was a ready-made opportunity, albeit on a grand scale. Michael Handel in Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought concludes: “As evidenced by the Allies’ successful use of deception during the Second World War, the Germanic-Clausewitzian tradition – which underestimates the potential of intelligence in general, and deception in particular – has become obsolete, while Sun Tzu’s positive estimation of them as indispensable remains eminently applicable.”[33]

Clausewitz saw little value in intelligence. As he saw war, the key elements to victory were strength in numbers, concentration of those forces in battle, and military genius. The opportunities to be lost were not worth the risk for the battlefield commanders as Clausewitz saw it: “In war, where imperfect intelligence, the threat of catastrophe, and the number of accidents are incomparably greater than in any other human endeavor, the amount of missed opportunities, so to speak, is, therefore, also bound to be greater.”[34] The close relationship between intelligence, surprise, deception, and diversion are obvious; however, for Clausewitz there is little strategic and tactical value to be realized for the battlefield commander, preferring to rely on strength in numbers, concentration of forces in space, and the leadership intangible of military genius. Intelligence did however win the war for the Allies in the Second World War. Key information was deciphered from the Japanese as early as 1942 prior to the Battle of Midway in the Pacific Theater and as early as 1942 against Germany in the battle for control of the Atlantic. The German U-boat menace in the Atlantic had to be addressed in order for merchant shipping to progress as an Allied supply line to the British and Soviets; as well as, a more secure route for the Allied build-up for ‘Operation Overlord.’ For Allied naval planners, intelligence became a critical strategy: “The intelligence effort paid rich dividends. Between May 1942 and May 1943 105 out of 174 convoys sailed across the Atlantic without interference from submarines; out of the 69 sighted by the wolf-packs 23 escaped without attack and 30 suffered only minor losses.”[35]

‘Absolute War’

All of the aforementioned strategies – surprise; deception; diversion; and intelligence have all shown their place in the Second World War. Military historian B.H. Liddell Hart in Strategy called for a revision of theory on strategy and grand strategy to address the new 20th Century thought on strategy. Hart took exception to Clausewitz’s notion of ‘absolute war.’ Hart, a staunch critic of Clausewitz offered: “This is the truth underlying Clausewitz’s definition of war as a ‘continuation of policy by other means’ – the prolongation of that policy through the war into the subsequent peace must always be borne in mind. A State which expends its strength to the point of exhaustion bankrupts its own policy, and future.”[36] Other historians have noted that the notion of ‘absolute war’ is theoretical as Clausewitz meant it to be; however, his definition suffers in its explanation of war in reality. P.M. Baldwin in his journal article ‘Clausewitz in Nazi Germany’ explains this dilemma:

To explain why absolute war is never met in reality, Clausewitz borrows the image of friction from physics. Not all forces can, in actuality, be deployed simultaneously, nor will those in charge of making the appropriate decisions ever be of one mind. Due to such ‘modifications of reality’, actual wars do not escalate to the absolute stage as a purely theory-bound consideration would expect. Nevertheless, although Clausewitz did at one time think that all wars, however limited in scope and objective they might on occasion be, aimed at the idea of absolute war and were prevented from achieving this goal only through the interference of the frictions of reality, the development of his thought led him to argue that limited wars with circumscribed aims and motivations might represent a special class of war, one no less ‘ideal’ than absolute war.’ [37]

Friction in War

0630hrs, the sixth of June 1944 on ‘Omaha Beach’… just get the men ashore. Clausewitz said “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” [38] For the American troops of the 1st Infantry Division and 29th Division what should have been so simple – was not. Unforeseen sandbars, enemy fire not neutralized by US naval gunfire, disorienting explosions from German artillery and Allied naval gunfire… strong currents pulling Higgins Boats landing craft far off-course… frightened US Navy coxswains dropping boat ramps too far from shore… brave men in a frantic struggle to dodge enfilade enemy fire jump over the boat’s sides into 15 feet of water weighed down by too much equipment… an Allied soldier finally makes cover only to realize his rifle is inoperable from sand, or saltwater, or enemy fire. The descriptive illustrations and narratives are in unlimited supply for the terror experienced by the Allied invaders on D-Day. Clausewitz added: “The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.”[39] For Clausewitz, it is the successful commander who is best able to manage the friction in war. On D-Day and the subsequent days following 6 June, many commanders (officers) were killed in action leaving platoons to be led by sergeants, companies led by young and inexperienced lieutenants, and so forth.

Paret in Makers of Modern Strategy offers that “In one form or another, friction is always present. Friction would dominate war if it were not countered by the creative employment of intellectual and emotional energy.”[40] It is this intellectual and emotional energy as well as what Clausewitz termed “military genius”, that the effective commander takes control of during the friction of war and thus strives towards the political goal.

Military Genius

The notion of ‘Military Genius’ as Clausewitz saw it was the essential element necessary for success in the face of war’s random nature or friction in war. Courage is a key component of genius for Clausewitz and as such is worthy of mention in our Clausewitzian synthesis of D-Day. Clausewitz recognized two types or kinds of courage: courage in the face of danger and the courage to accept responsibility.[41] There were countless acts of both forms of courage on the landing beaches at Normandy on that day. One story of courage that was neither medal-worthy nor previously deserving of a special place in D-Day history is highlighted by the late Stephen Ambrose from his ground-breaking D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II:

Sgt. John Ellery, 16th regiment, 1st Division, Easy Red sector of Omaha, recalled: “The first night in France I spent in a ditch beside a hedgerow wrapped in a damp shelter-half and thoroughly exhausted. But I felt elated. It had been the greatest experience of my life. I was ten feet tall. No matter what happened, I had made it off the beach and reached the high ground. I was king of the hill at least in my own mind, for a moment. My contribution to the heroic tradition of the United States Army might have been the smallest achievement in the history of courage, but at least, for a time, I had walked in the company of very brave men.[42]

The individual courage summoned by every Allied soldier struggling to survive on D-Day was vital for what Clausewitz observed as the soldier’s first requirement: “War is the realm of danger; therefore courage is the soldier’s first requirement.”[43] As Sgt. John Ellery was quoted by Ambrose, his small test of courage enabled him to survive that first day at Normandy.

In the few days following D-Day British troops led by British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery were unduly criticized for a perceived lack of aggressiveness against the Wehrmacht at Caen. At play were two different leadership styles borne out of different military philosophies. General George C. Marshall, US Chief of Staff of the Army espoused an aggressive attitude which conflicted with that of British General Alan Brooke, Chairman – Chiefs of Staff Committee. Andrew Roberts, author of Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945, notes the Clausewitzian principles employed by the Americans as opposed to the British in France:

‘Decisive defeat in battle breaks the enemy’s will to war and forces him to sue for peace.’ This was Marshall’s attitude towards war-fighting, and the message he intended to put over in London. It is the Clausewitzian approach to warfare, by which the enemy is relatively quickly brought to a decisive battle on the most important front. By contrast the British adopted an older concept, pioneered by the Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu, by which the enemy is worn down by peripheral attacks and only fully engaged once weakened.[44]

General George Marshall, as the top US Army leader during the Second World War, embraced what Clausewitz termed “boldness.” It was through this leadership ethos of boldness that drove the American troops to success at Normandy. Clausewitz in Chapter Six of his Third Book offered this on bold leadership: “In other words a distinguished commander without boldness is unthinkable. No man who is not born bold can play such a role, and therefore we consider this quality the first prerequisite of the great military leader.”[45]

Conclusion

Clausewitz’s On War consists of Eight Books titled ‘On the Nature of War’ (Book One); ‘On the Theory of War’ (Book Two); ‘On Strategy in General’ (Book Three); ‘The Engagement’ (Book Four); ‘Military Forces’ (Book Five); ‘Defense’ (Book Six); ‘The Attack’ (Book Seven); and “War Plans’ (Book Eight).  He was in the midst of revising On War’s early books when he died as a result of the great cholera epidemic of 1831, taking with him any potential brilliance to his already classic work. There is debate still as to which books were completely revised and which were not. Historians all agree however that he was reaching a much deeper understanding of his own theories and principles and had he lived to complete his revisions the final version would have been even more prodigious. Ian Roxborough, in his December 1994 article “Clausewitz and the Sociology of War” from the British Journal of Sociology in discussing the great military philosophers, notes the overall stature of Clausewitz’s work in On War:

However, despite this diversity, in the field of military writing about war the influence of Carl von Clausewitz is today dominant and pervasive. His major work, On War, is studied widely in the military, and aspects of his thought and writings are continuously referred to by strategist theorists. No other military thinker has this stature. Commentator after commentator notes the relevance of Clausewitz for contemporary thinking about warfare. Bernard Brodie [American military strategist and professor; 1910-1978], for example, has said that ‘Clausewitz’s genius is indisputable, and also in his field unique….His is not simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war’[46]

Paret in Makers of Modern Strategy advises that military leaders since the era of Clausewitz have not utilized On War as a manual but that the work still stands as the best collection of theories on war: “That so few scholars and soldiers have taken it up in something of Clausewitz’s spirit of objective inquiry, and with his ability to combine reality and theory, is not the least measure of his achievement.”[47]

Clausewitz’s On War endures as the single most important work of military philosophy and war. That he was able to so effectively write of the psychological, political, and strategic aspects of war from first-hand experience speaks to On War’s success and longevity. Clausewitz’s theories were not meant to be prescriptive as Paret notes throughout Makers of Modern Strategy. He adds that “we will find little evidence that soldiers and governments have made use of his theories… [But, wars] have repeatedly demonstrated the relevance of Clausewitz’s theories…”[48]

The Second World War was the single most defining event in modern history. The successes at both Tarawa and Normandy were vital towards ultimate Allied victory. Clausewitz’s arguments that comprise the fabric of On War easily find relevance in both events found within this paper. While the limited scope of this paper negates a complete synthesis of On War’s vast array of principles, the challenge remains to not find an abundance of relevant argument and theory from Clausewitz in many aspects of the Second World War.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

 

Alexander, Col. Joseph H. Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008.

Ambrose, Stephen E. D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

Baldwin, P.M. “Clausewitz in Nazi Germany,” Journal of Contemporary History 16, No. 1 (January 1981): 5-26 http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy1.apus.edu/stable/260614  [accessed November 5, 2011]

Beevor, Antony. D-Day: The Battle for Normandy. New York: Viking, 2009.

Beyerchen, Alan. “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War”, International Security 17, No. 3 (Winter, 1992-1993): 59-90 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539130 [accessed November 5, 2011]

Browning, Peter. The Changing Nature of Warfare: The Development of Land Warfare from 1792 to 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Congressional Medal of Honor Society. http://www.cmohs.org/recipient-detail/2996/shoup-david-monroe.php [accessed October 30, 2011]

Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. London: Routledge, 2001.

Hesketh, Roger. Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. New York: The Overlook Press, 2002.

Howard, Michael and Peter Paret, eds. Carl Von Clausewitz: On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Jablonsky, David. Roots of Strategy: Book 4. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1999.

Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.

Liddell Hart, B.H. Strategy. New York: Meridian, 1991.

——— . History of the Second World War. Old Saybrook: Konecky & Konecky, 1970.

Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997.

Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Roberts, Andrew. Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945. New York: HarperCollins, 2009.

Roxborough, Ian. “Clausewitz and the Sociology of War.”  The British Journal of Sociology Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 1994): 619-636 http://www.jstor.org/stable/591886 [accessed November 5, 2011]

———. The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War. New York: HarperCollins, 2011.


[1] Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Routledge, 2001) 20.

[2] Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.) 188.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., 208.

[5] Col. Joseph H. Alexander, USMC [Ret.], Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008) 12.

[6] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 535.

[7] Col. Joseph H. Alexander, USMC [Ret.], Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008) 241.

[8] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 535.

[9] Col. Joseph H. Alexander, USMC [Ret.], Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008) 363.

[10] Ibid., 31.

[11] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 363.

[12] Ibid., 366.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Col. Joseph H. Alexander, USMC [Ret.], Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008) 241.

[15] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 366.

[16] Congressional Medal of Honor Society, http://www.cmohs.org/recipient-detail/2996/shoup-david-monroe.php [accessed October 30, 2011]

[17] Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.) 206.

[18] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 121.

[19] Col. Joseph H. Alexander, USMC [Ret.], Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008) 172.

[20] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 120.

[21] Ibid., 87.

[22] Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Routledge, 2001) 139.

[23] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 96.

[24] Ibid., 198.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Andrew Roberts, The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War (New York: HarperCollinsPublishers) 465.

[27] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 198.

[28] Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (New York: The Overlook Press, 2002)

[29] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 96.

[30] Antony Beevor, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy (New York: Viking, 2009) 3.

[31] Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Routledge, 2001) 224.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid, 230.

[34] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 502

[35] Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997) 49.

[36] B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Meridian, 1991) 353.

[37] P.M. Baldwin, “Clausewitz in Nazi Germany” Journal of Contemporary History 16, No. 1 (January 1981) 8-9

[38] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 119.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.) 203.

[41] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 101.

[42] Stephen E. Ambrose, D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) 582.

[43] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 101.

[44] Andrew Roberts, Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 139.

[45] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 192.

[46] Ian Roxborough, “Clausewitz and the Sociology of War” The British Journal of Sociology 45, No. 4 (December 1994): 621-622 http://www.jstor.org/stable/591886 [accessed November 5, 2011] 621-622.

[47] Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.) 213.

[48] Ibid., 211.

 
 
 
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